Abstract. This paper focuses on stack inspection, the access control mechanism implemented in Java and the CLR. We introduce a static analysis which safely approximates the access rights granted to code at run time. This analysis provides us with the basis to reduce the run-time overhead of stack inspection and in combination with other program transformations.
Introduction
The growing use of network technologies in distributed computing has made security critical in the design, development, and distribution of applications. Indeed, both end users and application designers put special emphasis on security issues. For end users, an awareness of security mechanisms is crucial for choosing the best network services that match their requirements. Designers wish to control resource usage and access in order to ensure and maintain adequate security levels. Designing and implementing security policies at the programming language level help in handling security [23] . Here we consider an authorization-based model where a security policy is enforced by inserting appropriate checks in a program.
Java is perhaps the best known example of a language with a comprehensive architecture offering linguistic constructs for security. Java applications run components with different levels of trust, e.g., components originating from different, possibly unknown, administration domains. In the Java security model, access control decisions are taken by examining the call stack at run time. A permission is granted, provided that it belongs to all principals on the call stack. The so-called privileged operations are an exception. These are allowed to execute any code granted to their principal, regardless of the calling sequence. This access control mechanism is known as stack inspection. Beyond Java, other run-time environments (e.g., the .NET Common Language Runtime [19] ) adopt stack inspection as the basic authorization mechanism.
Stack inspection may be expensive. First, the runtime overhead due to the analysis of stack frames may grow very high. Second, stack inspection deeply affects those compiler optimizations, e.g., method inlining and tail call elimination, which may alter the structure of the call stack. Hence, understanding the semantics of program transformations in a setting with stack inspection is a research (and technological) challenge.
Our contribution aims at developing semantic-driven mechanisms as an aid to improving the efficiency of architectures for language-based security. The problem we face is not merely ensuring that certain program transformations preserve program semantics, but also to guarantee that the optimized code is security safe, that is, the optimized code will never violate the security constraints.
We build upon control flow analysis [20] , the main goal of which is to efficiently obtain computable approximations of the set of values or behaviors that may arise during the execution of a program. These approximations are then used to analyze program properties in a safe way: if a property holds at static time, then it will always hold at run time. The converse may not be true: the analysis may "err on the side of caution".
In this paper, we represent Java programs by control flow graphs, an idealized model not tied to any par-ticular language. Control flow graphs feature primitive constructs for method invocations, exceptions, and access control based on stack inspection. These graphs are equipped with a formal operational semantics.
Our first contribution is the definition of a static analysis over control flow graphs, called trace permissions analysis (TP analysis for short). Intuitively, this analysis computes, for each program point and each execution reaching that point, the set of permissions granted at run time. The TP analysis is sound and complete with respect to the operational semantics of our idealized language, i.e., it computes all and only the permissions that are granted at run time.
However, the execution traces of control flow graphs overapproximate the traces of the Java code they are extracted from. Therefore, if a permission is granted to an execution in a control flow graph, then it will also be granted to the corresponding execution -if any -of the Java code. In this sense we mean that our analysis is safe.
The ability of identifying statically the set of permissions granted at run time offers a support for securityaware code optimizations. As a first application, we detect and remove the redundant checks in a program, i.e., the checks that always pass. Dead code elimination is a program optimization that detects and removes code unused or unreached in executions. Security restrictions may cause more fragments of code to become unreachable, e.g., because a security check protecting it is never passed. Our technique permits one to discard such dead code in the linking phase. We also cope with method inlining, an optimization that replaces a method invocation with a copy of the called method code. In the presence of stack inspection, method inlining may break security because the protection domain of the inlined method is ignored. The TP analysis provides us with the basis to efficiently construct the set of method invocations that can be safely inlined. Our analysis also allows for fast implementations of stack inspection based on an (hyper-)eager strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the Java security model. Section 3 introduces our program model and its operational semantics; the adequacy of our model is discussed in Sect. 7. Our static analysis is in Sect. 4. Section 5 presents the secure program transformations.
As an example, we analyze in Sect. 6 a small e-commerce application. All the proofs, the Java code of our example, and the actual algorithm implementing our analysis are in the appendices.
Background on Java security
The Java language advocates code mobility: bytecode may come from different places, either trusted (e.g., files on the local disk) or untrusted (e.g., applets downloaded across the network). Java provides a customizable environment, called the sandbox, in which code is placed: the sandbox prevents untrusted code from performing security-critical operations, according to a fine-grained policy.
The class loader architecture brings bytecode from the outside into the JVM, so it is the first line of defense against security attacks, for the following reasons:
-It enforces name space separation of the loaded classes. Roughly, classes downloaded by different sources are placed into different name spaces. This mechanism constitutes a main contribution to the security of the Java platform. First, since duplicated class names are forbidden within a name space, a malicious class cannot pretend to be a system class. Second, since classes belonging to different name spaces cannot even detect each other's presence (unless class loaders explicitly allow them to), programmers are relieved of worries about class name collisions. -It assigns each loaded class to a protection domain [13] based on the class signers and location origin. Each protection domain is in turn associated with a set of permissions, according to a global security policy.
A verification step is performed on each loaded class before linking it to the rest of the system. This task is accomplished by the bytecode verifier, which statically analyzes the bytecode, to guarantee that it satisfies some safety properties, e.g., (1) access to classes, methods, and variables is achieved according to their respective visibility rules (access modifiers); (2) methods are invoked with the correct number and types of arguments.
While both the class loader and the bytecode verifier are mainly concerned with the safety facet of security, the security manager more directly addresses the problem of protecting critical resources from leakage and tampering threats. This is done by invoking the access controller before the security-critical methods of the protected resource are called.
The security policy is enforced by the access controller each time the method checkPermission is invoked. The access controller decides whether to grant access to the protected resource by performing stack inspection [12] . Stack inspection checks the sequence of method invocations. Each method in the sequence belongs to a class, which in turn belongs to a protection domain. A resource access is granted if and only if all protection domains in the sequence have the required permission. This mechanism is slightly complicated by the presence of privileged actions. Technically speaking, a method M performs a privileged action A by invoking AccessController.doPrivileged(A); this involves invoking method A.run() with all the permissions of M enabled. This can be seen as marking the method frame of M as privileged: stack inspection will then stop as soon as a privileged frame (starting from the top) is found.
There are at least two strategies for implementing this algorithm:
-The eager evaluation strategy states that the set of effective permissions is updated at each method call (and return). -In the lazy evaluation strategy, the call stack is retrieved and inspected only when access control is performed.
The program model
The stack inspection mechanism implements access control by looking solely into the call stack; then, we base our analyses on an abstraction of object-oriented languages that only takes into account security checks, method invocations and returns, and a very basic exception handling mechanism.
More precisely, we model a program as a control flow graph (CFG for short) whose nodes represent the activities mentioned above (checks, method invocations, and returns) and whose arcs represent the flow of control. We do not define how CFGs are extracted from an actual program. This construction is well understood and algorithms and tools exist for it; see, for example, [14, 20, 27, 28] .
By construction, CFGs hide any data flow information and are therefore approximated; typically, the conditional construct is rendered as a nondeterministic choice. This approximation is safe, in the sense that any actual execution flow is represented by a path in the CFG. However, the converse may not be true: some paths may exist that do not correspond to any actual execution. For instance, both branches of an "if" statement are represented, even when the same branch is always taken at run time.
There is a further source of approximation, especially for object-oriented languages with dynamic resolution of method invocations. When a program invokes an instance method on an object O, the run-time environment may have to choose among various implementations of that method. The decision is not based on the declared type of O but on the actual class O belongs to, which is unpredictable at static time. To be safe, CFGs overapproximate the set of methods that can be invoked at each program point. This is a main source of approximation for the analyses built over CFGs.
Syntax
Let D be a finite set of protection domains and P be a finite set of permissions. CFGs are defined as follows. Definition 1. A CFG N ∪ {n ε }, E, Priv, Dom is an oriented graph, where -N is the set of nodes. Each node n ∈ N is associated with a label (n), describing the control flow primitive it represents. Labels partition nodes into three kinds: call nodes, which stand for method invocation; return nodes, which represent return from a method; and check nodes, which enforce the access control policy. For each P ∈ P, we can think of a node labeled check(P ) as the abstract representation of an AccessController.checkPermission(P) instruction in the Java language. The distinguished element n ε / ∈ N plays the technical role of a single, isolated entry point. -E ⊆ (N ∪ {n ε }) × N is the set of edges. Edges are partitioned into four sets: entry edges • −→ n, which represent the entry points of a program; call edges n −→ n , which model interprocedural flow; transfer edges n n , which correspond to sequencing; and catch edges n n , which correspond to exception handling. The last two kinds of edges represent intraprocedural flow. The set of entry edges contains all pairs (n ε , n), where n is a program entry point. The n ε element is the source of entry edges only.
-Priv : N → Bool tells whether a node enables its privileges or not. -Dom : N → D is a mapping from nodes to protection domains.
When unambiguous, we shall write N, E instead of N ∪ {n ε }, E, Priv, Dom . Each CFG is associated with a security policy Perm : D → 2 P , which grants a set of permissions to each protection domain. Hereafter we will always abbreviate Perm(Dom(n)) as Perm(n).
It is now convenient to introduce some terminology and notations.
Definition 2. The methods of a CFG N, E are the connected components of the graph N, E , where E is the set of intraprocedural edges in E, with no orientation. We call µ(n) the method to which node n belongs. The entry points of µ(n) are defined as
Definition 3. The set ρ(n) of return nodes associated with a node n is
Definition 4. The set ξ(n) of nodes that may throw an exception catchable by n is defined as the smallest set satisfying
The set ξ 1 (n) of nodes that may propagate an exception to n is defined as
Our CFGs obey some mild well-formedness constraints to reflect more appropriately some peculiarities of Java-like bytecode, as shown below. Therefore, in what follows we shall always assume that CFGs are such. Constraint 1. It makes little sense breaking a check into several parts, or merging it with other activities, e.g., with a method call. Therefore, all and only the code of a checkPermission method is represented as a single check node. Formally, check nodes do not admit outgoing call edges:
=⇒ ¬∃n ∈ N. n −→ n .
Constraint 2.
Return nodes have no outgoing edges:
Return nodes model exit points of methods, e.g., the ireturn and areturn instructions. They cannot have outgoing call edges because this kind of flow only originates from method invocations (e.g., from invokevirtual or invokespecial instructions). Return nodes cannot have outgoing transfer or catch edges, either, as such edges only represent intraprocedural flow. Then, this constraint is satisfied by CFGs derived from actual bytecode.
Constraint 3. Each method has a single entry point, i.e., for each n ∈ N | ε(µ(n)) | = 1 .
Upon method invocation, the virtual machine creates a new stack frame for the called method and sets the program counter to the first instruction in the new frame: this instruction is just the entry point of the called method. After this constraint, we abbreviate n −→ ε(µ(m)) as n −→ µ(m).
Constraint 4. Nodes in the same method are in the same protection domain: Indeed, in Java the granularity of a security policy is the class level: classes in the same code source are in the same protection domain.
Constraint 5. Only call nodes can be privileged:
In general, security checks can also occur within privileged actions: however, privileged check nodes make little sense because it is always possible to determine whether a privileged check will succeed or not during the construction of the CFG. Similarly, there is no point in enabling returns to be privileged because a return node will never be on the call stack while being inspected. As a matter of fact, Constraint 5 can easily be removed, at the price of a slightly more involved analysis.
A more detailed discussion on the adequacy of our proposal, along with some hints on possible extensions, can be found in Sect. 7. Example 1. We use the CFG in Fig. 1 as a working example through the paper. Circled calls are privileged. Solid boxes enclose nodes belonging to the same methods, and they are labeled with the protection domain to which the enclosed method belongs. Table 1   Table 1 . Methods, return nodes, and exceptions for CFG in Fig. 1 n
displays the methods, their entry points, the return nodes, the nodes that may throw exceptions, and those that may propagate them, according to Definitions 2, 3, and 4.
Semantics
The operational semantics of CFGs is defined by a transition system whose configurations are sequences of nodes modelling call stacks. Additionally, each state has a boolean tag that tells whether an exception is active, i.e., thrown and not yet caught. Formally, we define the set of states as N * × Bool . If no exception is active, a state is represented as a sequence of nodes enclosed in square brackets: for example, σ = [n 0 , . . . , n k ] is a state whose top node is n k . If an exception is active, we append the symbol to the sequence of nodes, i.e., σ abbreviates σ, true . Pushing a node n on a stack σ is written as σ : n (the infix operator : associates to the left).
The transition relation between states is the minimal relation induced by the inference rules in Table 2 . A trace of G leading to σ k , x k is a derivation
where σ 0 = [] and x 0 = false. By overloading the notation, we also denote by the relation
stating when there is a trace of G that can lead to a given state. We say that a node n is reachable iff σ : n, x is a reachable configuration.
In our formalization, we use a slightly simplified version of the full access control algorithm presented in [12] . A discussion of the differences between the two models is in Sect. 7. 
The simplified algorithm scans the call stack topdown. Each frame in the stack refers to the protection domain containing the class to which the called method belongs. As soon as a frame is found whose protection domain does not have the required permission, an AccessControlException is raised. The algorithm succeeds when a privileged frame is found that carries the required permission, or when all frames have been visited. We formally specify this behavior by the minimal relation induced by the inference rules for in Table 2 . We say that a permission P is granted to a state σ if σ P .
Example 2. The following traces illustrate the behavior of the CFG in Fig. 1 . We also show that a check on a permission P is passed by writing P and P otherwise. The state σ in (b) and (c) can be any sequence of alternating n 0 and n 1 , ending in n 1 .
σ : n 0 : n 2 : n 5 : n 8 P 0 σ : n 0 : n 2 : n 5 : n 9 σ : n 0 : n 2 : n 6 P 1 σ : n 0 : n 2 : n 7 σ : n 0 : n 4 (c) [] · · · σ : n 0 : n 1 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 2 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 2 : n 5 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 2 : n 5 : n 8 P 0 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 2 : n 5 : n 8 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 2 : n 5 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 2 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 3 P 2 σ : n 0 : n 1 : n 3 σ :
Trace permissions analysis
We introduce the trace permissions (TP) analysis, a static analysis over CFGs that computes the access rights granted to each reachable state. Since the set of permissions granted to a state is the intersection of the permissions associated with each protection domain traversed after the last privileged frame (if any), we can identify the set { P ∈ P | σ P } with the security context Γ(σ), where Γ : N * → 2 D is defined as follows:
The set of permissions granted to a security context γ is
The permissions granted to the security context of a state σ are exactly the permissions granted to σ, as established by the following theorem:
Given a CFG G and a security policy Perm, the analysis is specified by the set of equations T P = (G, Perm) in Table 3 . Flow equations for TP analysis
that satisfies all the equations. The purpose of the analysis is to find, for each node n, the set of security contexts:
The reason why we ask the TP analysis to compute security contexts -instead of plain sets of permissions -is that the knowledge on which protection domains have been visited is needed for some optimizations (e.g., for method inlining). Technically, TP is a forward, monotone control flow analysis with values in 2 2 D . Since both G and D are finite, the least solution to the analysis does exist and is finitely computable, e.g., through the worklist algorithm in Appendix A.
For each node n, edge (n, n ), and reachable state σ : n, the analysis comprises the following sets:
-τ in (n) contains the context Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)}, which is equal to the context of σ : n if n is not privileged, and it is {Dom(n)} otherwise. -τ call (n) contains the context of σ : n, i.e., τ call (n) ⊇ Γ(σ : n). -If σ : n σ : n , i.e., the control of execution flows sequentially from n to n , then τ trans (n) contains the context Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)}.
-If σ : n σ : n , i.e., an exception active at n is caught by n , then τ catch (n) contains the context Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)}.
The only equation for T P in says that τ in (n) consists of the union of the contexts τ out (m, n) for each edge (m, n). When (m, n) represents interprocedural flow, then τ out (m, n) consists of the context at m, plus the context Dom(n) (second equation for T P out ). Otherwise, τ out (m, n) comprises just the contexts at m. The first equation for T P call lifts to Dom(n) the context of n when n is privileged. If n is a check for permission P , then τ trans (n) contains all the contexts in τ in (n) that pass the check (first equation for T P trans ). The predicate Trans(n, γ) is true for all the contexts γ such that an execution starting from n with context γ can reach a return node in some method called by n.
If n is a privileged call, then τ trans (n) equals τ in (n) if Trans(n, {Dom(n)}) is true, otherwise it is empty (second equation for T P trans ). If n is not privileged, then τ trans (n) contains all the contexts γ ∈ τ in (n) such that Trans(n, γ) is true (third equation for T P trans ). The predicate Catch(n, γ) is true for all the contexts γ that suffice to reach some node m that can propagate an exception catchable by n. If n is a privileged call, then τ catch (n) equals τ in (n) if Catch(n, {Dom(n)}) is true, otherwise it is empty (second equation for T P catch ). If n is not privileged, then τ catch (n) contains all the contexts γ ∈ τ in (n) such that Catch(n, γ) is true (third equation for T P catch ).
The following theorem states the correctness of the TP analysis. The first equation below states that any solution to the analysis is sound w.r.t. the operational semantics. The second equation states that the least solution to the analysis is also complete. This fact should not seem bizarre: indeed, completeness is only up to the precision of the CFG, which is an approximated model of the analyzed program.
Moreover, the minimal solution w.r.t. the inclusion relation on 2
The worklist algorithm in Appendix A that actually computes the (unique) minimal solution to the analysis has computational complexity O(c · |N |) = O(|N |). The constant c depends on the number of protection domains occurring in G: in the worst case, c = 2
However, the exponential factor only occurs when the number of protection domains is proportional to the number of nodes. Actually, the number of protection domains can be considered as a constant because it depends on the security policy, rather than on the size of the program (for more details, see Appendix A).
Example 3. The least solution to TP for the CFG in Fig. 1 comprises
A feature not discussed above concerns dynamic linking. This mechanism allows a program to be extended on demand, e.g., with code downloaded from the network. Our program model does not directly support this feature; however, the TP analysis (though not in a fully compositional way) supports a form of incremental computation (see [2] for details).
Program transformations
In this section we show that the TP analysis provides us with an effective basis for several code optimizations. This is not a trivial task because performing interprocedural optimizations in the presence of stack inspection may break security. Indeed, stack inspection deeply relies on the structure of the call stack, which may be altered by such optimizations.
Elimination of redundant checks
Our first application of the TP analysis is a code optimization that detects and removes the redundant checks occurring in a program, i.e., those checks that always pass, regardless of the execution trace.
The following theorem states conditions to recognize redundant checks, thus enabling the compiler to safely remove them from the code:
For each node n, let Π(n) be the set of permissions (statically) granted to n:
If (n) = check(P ) and P ∈ Π(n), then n is redundant, i.e., ∀σ ∈ N * :
Actually, redundant checks can only be disabled in the presence of dynamic linking because loading a new method may add new traces where the permission is no longer granted. A similar situation also holds for the other optimizations of (lazy) stack inspection considered below.
Dead code elimination
Dead code elimination is a program optimization that prevents the compiler from generating bytecode for unreachable or useless pieces of code. Dead code elimination reduces both the size of the generated bytecode and the total application running time (e.g., when code has to be downloaded from the network).
The following theorem allows one to detect (and remove) those pieces of code that cannot be reached due to security restrictions:
Method inlining
Method inlining is a general program optimization that replaces a method invocation with a copy of the called method code. As a side effect, the protection domain of the inlined method is ignored while stack inspection is being performed, which may then become unsafe. The TP analysis can be exploited to compute the set of method invocations that can be safely inlined. Intuitively, a method invocation may be inlined if the outcome of the security checks is not affected by ignoring the protection domain of the inlined method.
We adopt the so-called original version inlining approach [16] , which always considers the original version of the callee and the current version of the caller when performing inlinings. This can be obtained by duplicating the original code of the inlined method.
Letṅ be the node candidate for inlining, andṅ −→ n . We assume that the method invocation represented byṅ can be statically dispatched, i.e., it has exactly one callee, represented by µ(n ).
The decision procedure, which tells whether or not the inlining ofṅ is safe, is outlined below. We first assign a fresh name to the protection domain of µ(n ), without modifying its granted permissions. Assume that a solution τ to the TP analysis is available. We restart the worklist algorithm fromṅ in order to isolate the protection domain of µ(n ) in the computed security contexts. This allows for the definition of a function Inlṅ that simulates the effect of method inlining on security contexts: given a context γ, Inlṅ(γ) is obtained by substituting the protection domain of µ(n ) for that of µ(ṅ). Each time a check node n is reached, we ensure that for each context γ ∈ τ in (n), γ and Inlṅ(γ) agree on the permission P checked by n, i.e., P ∈ Π(γ) ⇐⇒ P ∈ Π(Inlṅ(γ)).
The inlining ofṅ is safe if this holds for each check node reached during this procedure. Note that it is possible to deal with the general case of virtual calls with many callees: this only requires some more machinery (all the possible callees must be inlined).
We formally specify in Definition 5 when a method invocation can be safely inlined. The condition set by (1a) guarantees static dispatching ofṅ, as well as thatṅ is not a recursive call (otherwise inlining makes little sense). The condition set by (1b) rephrases the original version inlining approach. The condition set by (1c) ensures that the protection domain ofṅ is isolated. These conditions, apart fromṅ being nonrecursive, can easily be satisfied, as noted above. The key condition is (1d): it guarantees that the security checks passed after inlining are exactly those passed before inlining.
We say thatṅ is inlineable iffṅ −→ n is inlineable for some node n .
Next, we define the effect of the method inlining transformation on CFGs. Instead of substitutingṅ for µ(n ) and adjusting the edges accordingly, we equivalently operate on the semantics of the transformed CFG.
The effect of the inlining ofṅ on states is specified by the function inlṅ in Table 4 . Given a state σ, inlṅ(σ) is obtained by removing all the occurrences ofṅ in σ (except whenṅ is in the top position).
The operational semantics of a CFG after the inlining ofṅ is defined by the transition relation ṅ in Table 4 . For instance, the rules icall1 and icall2 state, respectively, that method invocation proceeds as usual when the calling node is notṅ, otherwiseṅ is removed from the call stack.
According to the above definitions, we may end up with privileged checks and returns. We already pointed Table 4 . Specification of method inlining
out that this would only require a more involved definition of the TP analysis (see the discussion on Constraint 5).
The following theorem states the correctness of method inlining: each trace in the original CFG corresponds to a trace in itsṅ-inlined version.
Theorem 5. Ifṅ is inlineable in G andĠ is theṅ-inlined version of G, then
Eager stack inspection
The eager evaluation strategy for stack inspection allows security checks to be performed very efficiently; there is, however, an overhead at each cross-domain method invocation (and return) because the security context must be keep updated. Since security checks are statistically less frequent than cross-domain calls, actual implementations of the JDK adopt the lazy strategy. However, the eager strategy is still worth considering: indeed, in combination with the security passing style of [30] it allows for interprocedural optimizations, which are instead prevented by the lazy strategy. Actual implementations of the eager evaluation strategy [31] have nevertheless shown worse performance than implementations of the lazy strategy. Our TP analysis helps in improving the performance of eager stack inspection. Below, we specify a novel implementation technique for it that exploits our analysis to efficiently update the security contexts.
We adopt the security passing style to track the security context as an additional parameter of each method invocation. The type of this parameter is assumed to be one of the primitive integral types of the JVM (i.e., byte, short, int, and long); accordingly, its size (in bits) is then k ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64}.
Choose a set D 0 = {D 1 , . . . , D k−1 } ⊆ D of protection domains. If D does not have enough elements, add the needed ones, and assign them arbitrary permissions.
Given a CFG G and a security policy Perm, a solution to T P = (G, Perm) can be used to enumerate the set { Γ(σ) | G σ } of the reachable security contexts. Let γ 0 , . . . , γ p be such an enumeration. Represent now a security context γ i as a k-bits array α i = α i,0 , . . . , α i,k−1 , where
Security contexts are updated at each method invocation and return. The intuition is that 2 D 0 contains the contexts that we expect to occur with high probability in executions and therefore require very efficient updating. These contexts are represented as arrays of bits: the i-th bit is set iff the protection domain D i has been traversed.
The contexts outside 2 D 0 are represented by their indexes in the enumeration computed by the TP analysis. The transition function h between security contexts is cached in a hash table; h is computed as a side effect when constructing a solution to the TP analysis. Formally, h(i, n, n ) = j whenever γ j is the context of the state obtained when the control flows from n to n , starting from a state with context γ i . There is no need to store the entries of h where both γ i and γ j are in 2 D 0 . Formally, the context updating operations are implemented as follows:
-On method invocation, let n be a call to µ(n ) and the current security context be
That is, α i,j is set to indicate that D j has been traversed. Otherwise, the new context is α h(i,n,n ) . -On method return, the context is retrieved from the popped call stack.
Security checks are performed by looking at the current context instead of by inspecting the call stack. The intuition is that, for the contexts in 2 D 0 , a check for permission P j succeeds iff no protection domain D i such that P j / ∈ Perm(D i ) has been traversed.
More formally, let P 1 , . . . , P q be the set of permissions checked in G. For each j ∈ 1..q, we define a k-bits array β j = 0, β j,1 , . . . , β j,k−1 as follows:
Let n be a check for permission P j and γ i be the current context, and let n follow n sequentially. If γ i ⊆ D 0 , then the check succeeds iff α i ∧ β j = 0 (bitwise and). Otherwise, the check succeeds iff h(i, n, n ) is defined.
Compared with the lazy evaluation strategy, our technique involves an overhead at each method invocation: besides the cost of passing an additional parameter, we have to perform either a "bitwise or" operation (or a hash table lookup). Security checks require a "bitwise and" (or a hash table lookup) and are independent of the size of the call stack. As a matter of fact, a good choice of the set D 0 is crucial and possibly requires a statistical estimate of the frequency of contexts.
An e-commerce example
To illustrate our analysis, we consider a small e-commerce application written in Java and displayed in Appendix B. As a simple optimization we then detect the redundant checks. Four actors are involved:
-An application server (Bank), with a remote interface to perform queries and transactions over bank accounts. -An e-commerce provider (Shop), which interacts with users and the bank to manage the acquisition and payment of goods. -A fraudulent entity (Robber), which spoofs for a trusted e-commerce provider. -A user agent (Client), which exploits the e-commerce facilities offered by Shop and Robber.
We consider below only the security properties of the code executed on the client and on the application server.
The user agent runs a Java-enabled Web browser, which has the rights to access the local filesystem (in both read and write mode) and to open a socket connection. The client-tier components of the trusted and untrusted e-commerce providers are implemented as Java applets; thus they are executed by the Java virtual machine embedded in the browser.
The Browser class provides the applets with some facilities to manage the user preferences: the getPrefs() method tries to retrieve the preferences (e.g., payment settings) from a local file if the applet has the rights to do so. Otherwise, it opens a socket connection with the remote server where the applet was downloaded. The server is then delegated to send back the preferences to the applet. The changePrefs() method first looks for the old preferences (they are either in the local disk or on the remote server); then, it asks the user for the new preferences, which are thereafter saved on the local disk (if the applet has the rights to do so) or sent to the remote server.
The Shop applet is basically a two-stage agent. First, the applet registers the user profile. The user is asked to fill out a form containing, e.g., its bank account number; then, the registration data are stored by the changePrefs() method. Once the user has been registered, it can start purchasing items from the provider. When the user orders an item, the applet looks for its registration data by calling the getPrefs() method. The data are sent back to the e-commerce server, which performs the transaction on the bank server.
The Robber applet acts similarly. Indeed, the two applets cannot be distinguished by looking solely at their control flow. However, this applet may still perform some fraudulent operations by acting on the data flow. For instance, it can exploit the user account number to steal the user's money. Moreover, the robber can corrupt some sensitive information on the user's local disk by a malicious use of the changePrefs() method.
The Bank class features a defensive implementation of a simple account manager. Its public interface consists of one boolean query (canpay()) and three transactions (debit(), credit(), and transfer()). Each of these methods is protected by an appropriate security check. The canpay() method tests if at least a given amount of money can be withdrawn from a bank account. The debit() method withdraws a sum from that account, provided there is enough money. The credit() method deposits a sum in an account. The transfer() method withdraws (if possible) a sum from an account, which it then deposits into another account. The local file system is always accessed in privileged mode.
Two clients aim at exploiting the services offered by the bank: Shop, which is trusted, and Robber, which is not granted any permission.
Shop performs the money transfer from the user account, having first checked that the user has enough money. This is done by invoking the canpay() and transfer() methods in sequence.
Robber acts in the same manner. Again, its behavior cannot be taken apart from that of Shop by looking only at the control flow. The Robber tries to steal money from the user account, but it does not have the rights to do that (even if it has knowledge of the user account number).
The CFGs and the security policies extracted from the Java programs in Appendix B are shown in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. Dashed boxes enclose the methods belonging to the same protection domain. Notice that the conditional constructs are modeled by nondeterminism in the intraprocedural flow.
The results of the iterations of the worklist algorithm for the client side and for the server side are shown respectively in Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix B. We abbreviate the names of protection domains using their initial letters; for instance, "UB" stands for the security context {Unknown, Bank }. Notice that, in Table 6 , τ in (n) = τ call (n), because no call is privileged in the CFG in Fig. 2 .
We exploit the TP analysis to detect the redundant checks. Consider the client-side in Fig. 2 first. By Table 6 , we have that, at node n 11 ,
By the definition of Π, we have that Π(n 11 ) = Perm(Trusted). Then, the check at n 11 is redundant, because P write ∈ Perm(Trusted ). For node n 13 , we have
Here Π(n 13 ) = Perm(Trusted ) ∩ Perm(Restricted) = ∅, so the check at n 13 is indeed necessary. For node n 15 we have
Then, Π(n 15 ) = Perm(Restricted ). Since P connect ∈ Perm(Restricted ), the check at n 15 is redundant.
We now focus on the server side (Fig. 3) . By Table 7 , we have that, at n 4 , τ call (n 4 ) = {{Client, Bank }, {Unknown, Bank }} . Therefore, the check at n 4 is indeed necessary because P canpay / ∈ Π(n 4 ) = ∅. For nodes n 7 , n 12 and n 16 , we have
Then, Π(n 7 ) = Π(n 12 ) = Π(n 16 ) = Perm(Client). Since P debit , P transfer , P credit are granted to Client , it turns out that all the checks in Bank, except n 4 , are redundant. Finally, for nodes n 20 and n 22 , we have
Then, both the checks are redundant because Π(n 20 ) = Π(n 22 ) = Perm(Bank ) and P read , P write ∈ Perm(Bank ).
Model adequacy and future work
There are some differences between our model and the Java security model [12]:
-Our model prevents a permission P to be granted to a state σ : n if P does not belong to the permissions granted to Dom(n), i.e., P / ∈ Perm(n) implies σ : n P . Instead, in the Java security model, P may be implied by some permission P ∈ Perm(n), e.g., FilePermission("/-","read") implies the permission to read any file on the local disk. We can easily extend our program model by introducing a partial order on permissions to encompass permission implications. The inclusion test P ∈ Perm(n) in the rules for should be replaced by Perm(n) ⇒ P , which tests if P is implied by some permission P ∈ Perm(n).
-Although the Java security model allows for the dynamic instantiation of permissions (e.g., an application that asks the user for a file name and then tries to open that file), we only consider the permissions that can be determined statically. We are investigating an extension of our present approach to deal with permissions on the form P (x), where x ranges over the set of possible targets for the permissions of class P . -Starting with version 1.4.1, the Java SDK has added support for dynamic security policies. This means that the binding between a class and its permissions can be deferred until the class protection domain is involved in an access control test (rather than when the class is loaded). With our current approach, the whole analysis has to be recomputed from scratch each time the security policy is changed. A control flow analysis that is parameterized with respect to the security policy allows for more incremental behavior. This subject is currently under investigation; preliminary results are in [3]. -In the Java security model, a new thread upon creation inherits the access control context (i.e., the set of protection domains for the classes on the call stack) from its parent. When stack inspection is performed, both the context of the current thread and the contexts of all its ancestors are examined, so a child thread cannot obtain a resource access that is not granted to its ancestors. We do not model threads. To consider them, we should first single out the program points where new threads can be created (and started) while constructing the CFG (as done in [17]). -We consider a "skeletal" exception handling mechanism, where exceptions are all of the same type, and neither nested try blocks nor finally clauses are featured. A full treatment of exceptions requires a tailored construction of the CFG, e.g., by the techniques presented in [7, 25] , which also suggest how to adjust interprocedural analyses to exceptions. -In our model, only code-centric security policies are allowed: permissions are granted to code according to its code source, regardless of who is running it. The Java Authentication and Authorization Service [18] extends the Java security model by enabling user-centric access control policies based on the principal who actually runs the code. Permissions can be granted to principals, and the doAs method allows a piece of code to be executed on behalf of a given subject. This is done by associating the (authenticated) subject running the code with the current access control context. Stack inspection ensures that subjects are taken into account when access control is performed (see, e.g., [15] for a formal specification).
There are some features of the Java security architecture we think difficult to cope with: they are reflection, native methods, and some "dangerous" permissions implications (e.g., AllPermission may even breach the whole security system by replacing the JVM system binaries). Besides deeply affecting security, these features reduce the effectiveness of any analysis that aims at determining statically the permissions granted to running code.
Conclusions and related work
We have developed a technique to perform program transformations in the presence of stack inspection. The technique relies on the definition of our trace permissions analysis. It is a control flow analysis and computes a safe approximation to the set of permissions that are always granted to bytecode at run time. The analysis is sound and complete w.r.t. the control flow graphs derived from the bytecode (however, these graphs only approximate the actual behavior). Our analysis makes various optimizations possible. We focused here on elimination of redundant checks and of dead code, on method inlining, and on eager stack inspection. A similar approach also applies to general tail call elimination. Although we restricted our attention to Java, the same techniques work as well with other programming languages whose authorization mechanisms rely on stack inspection (e.g., C [32]). It is worthwhile noting that our analysis can take advantage of the control flow graphs generated by the HotSpot optimizers embedded in the latest JVMs [26] . This would also make our technique directly exploitable by these tools, e.g., to produce larger methods by inlining, thereby allowing for further optimizations.
Many authors have advocated the use of static techniques in order to understand and optimize stack inspection.
Besson et al. [6] were among the first to apply static techniques to the verification of global security properties. They formalize classes of security properties through a linear-time temporal logic. They show that a large class of policies (including stack inspection) can be expressed in this formalism, while more sophisticated ones (like the Chinese Wall policy) are not. Model checking is then used to prove that local security checks enforce a given global security policy. Their verification method is based on the translation from linear-time temporal formulae to deter-ministic finite-state automata, and it can be used to optimize stack inspection. For each node n, the analysis in [6] can compute the set
where P check is the set of permissions checked in G. The computational complexity of the method is O (c · |N |) , where the constant c depends on the cardinality of P check (in the worst case, c = 2 |P check | ). Therefore, our trace permissions analysis performs better when there are few protection domains, while [6] is more efficient when there are few security checks. Note that our analysis is at least as precise as [6], because P check ⊆ P. Also, the analysis in [6] does not seem to scale up smoothly to handle dynamic linking because it must be recomputed each time a new permission is discovered.
Based on the same program model of [6], Besson et al.
[5] develop a static analysis that computes, for each method, the set of its secure calling contexts with respect to a given global security property. When a method is invoked from a secure calling context, it is guaranteed that its execution will not violate the global property. For some optimizations, e.g., for method inlining, this technique is even too powerful, as the information about calling contexts is unnecessary.
Esparza et al.
[10] tackle stack inspection in terms of model checking pushdown systems (PDSs). Obdržálek [21] uses the same technique to accurately model Java exception handling. A suitable combination of the two will then be an alternative approach to ours. Since our model is specifically tailored to stack inspection, we think that our analysis may be implemented and exploited more efficiently than a general method such as model-checking PDSs. As in [6], the latter approach seem to suffer from dynamic linking, in particular when some program transformations (e.g., method inlinings) have to be revalidated at run time.
Walker [29] explores an alternative approach. When a security-unaware program is compiled, a centralized security policy dictates where to insert run-time checks in order to obtain provably secure compiled code. An optimization phase follows: whenever a security check is removed, it is replaced by a proof that the optimized code is still safe. Before executing a piece of code, a certified verification software ensures that it respects the centralized security policy. Security properties are specified by security automata [4, 24] . This mechanism is rather powerful (it subsumes linear temporal logic), but it does not handle some interesting properties, e.g., information flow, resource availability, liveness, performance. Actually, security automata can only express a proper subset of the class of safety properties. The policies specified by security automata can be enforced by inlined reference monitors, which control the execution steps of target applications, terminating those about to violate the security policy in force. Inlined ref-
One of the main drawbacks of [6, 29] is the difficulty of mechanically determining a "suitable" global security property for an arbitrary program, i.e., a property that, if enforced, guarantees safe execution.
Wallach et al.
[31] formalize stack inspection by exploiting the access control logic of [1] . The authors show that their decision procedure is equivalent to Java stack inspection, according to an informal operational semantics. Moreover, they propose an alternative semantics of eager stack inspection called security-passing style. This technique consists of tracking the security state of an execution as an additional parameter of each method invocation. This allows for interprocedural compiler optimizations that do not interfere with stack inspection. The security-passing style allows each security operation to be performed in constant time, but it involves an overhead, because the security state must be computed at each method invocation. Dynamic caching techniques are adopted to reduce this overhead: therefore, in the optimal case, the additional cost of each method invocation is that of a hash lookup. The same technique allows for an implementation of security checks that requires a hash lookup in the optimal case. Instead, in our approach, each security operation costs a hash lookup in the worst case, while, in the optimal case, it is as cheap as a bitwise operation. A further difference w.r.t. our approach is that [31] assumes that the whole program is available at compilation time.
Pottier et al.
[22] address the problem of stack inspection in λ sec , a typed lambda calculus enriched with primitive constructs for enforcing security checks and managing permissions. They have polymorphic types of the form τ 1 → ς → τ 2 , where τ 1 , τ 2 are types and ς is a set of permissions. Intuitively, the type τ 1 → ς → τ 2 details the security context necessary to execute a function of type τ 1 → τ 2 . Stack inspection never fails on a well-typed program because the set of permissions granted at run time always includes the security context. These types are very powerful and can deal with several issues (e.g., security policy overriding and dependencies from untrusted code). Moreover, they can be smoothly extended to deal with objects by standard type-theoretic techniques. This analysis supports all-or-nothing optimizations that remove the security manager when all the checks are redundant. Instead, we can single out and remove individual redundant checks.
The problem of establishing the correctness of program transformations in the presence of stack inspection is investigated by Fournet and Gordon in [11] . They present an equational theory, together with a coinductive proof technique, for the λ sec calculus. They study how stack inspection affects program behavior, proving that certain function inlinings and tail-call eliminations are correct. The equational theory is used to reason about the (somewhat limited) security proper-ties actually guaranteed by stack inspection. Here we are more concerned with efficient (semantically based) optimization procedures to be used in the field rather than with a general reasoning framework. Indeed, it is unclear how to (mechanically) derive a procedure (e.g., a confluent terminating rewriting system) to ensure correctness of program transformations under security constraints.
Clemens and Felleisen [8] present a different semantics of (eager) stack inspection on continuation CESK machines, which allows for tail-call optimizing implementations.
Compared with our approach, [8, 11, 22] consider more basic programming primitives (e.g., there are no exception mechanisms). Also, static typing appears to be more difficult than control flow analysis when permissions can be dynamically instantiated. Indeed, we argue that typing and control flow analysis are complementary static techniques. Approaches based on types focus more on defining safe programming disciplines; control flow analysis, instead, seems more accurate in efficiently determining effective program optimizations.
Koved et al.
[17] address the problem of computing the set of permissions a class needs in order to execute without throwing security exceptions. Also, this analysis suffers from allowing only all-or-nothing optimizations, as in [22] . The analysis is built on access rights invocation graphs. These flow graphs are context sensitive: each node is associated also with its calling context, i.e., with its target method, receiver, and parameters values. In this way, the analysis in [17] can deal with parametric permissions and multithreading. Our approach can gain precision through the exploitation of these graphs. We plan to study this issue in future work. 
be a trace on G, where σ k = σ : n : m. Then By the induction hypothesis, we have that
Since any derivation for σ : n : m requires at least two steps, it must be j > 1. Then, the induction hypothesis on j − 1 gives n −→ µ(m), and ∃i ∈ 1..j − 1. σ i , x i = σ : n, false .
Lemma 2.
Proof. By Lemma 1, G σ : n : m implies that n −→ µ(m). Since (m) = return, by Definition 3 it follows that m ∈ ρ(n).
Lemma 3.
k be a trace leading to σ : n , and define
Since the only rule that raises an exception is fail , the transition σ i σ i +1 must be of the form (n ) = check(P ) σ : n P σ : n σ : n , where σ i = σ i +1 = σ : n . By Definition 4 we have ξ(n ) = {n } = ∅. Now, let i ∈ i + 1..k − 1. Since the only rule that propagates an exception is throw , the transition σ i σ i+1 must be of the form m σ : n : m σ : n , where σ i = σ : n : m and σ i+1 = σ : n . By an inductive argument, it follows that ξ(m) = ∅. Moreover, m holds, and n −→ µ(m) follows by Lemma 1; by Definition 4, we then have ξ(n ) ⊇ ξ(m). Since ξ(m) = ∅, this implies ξ(n ) = ∅.
A.2 Soundness of the TP analysis
Theorem 6. For all σ ∈ N * , P ∈ P: . For the inductive case, let σ = σ : n. There are two subcases, according to whether n is privileged or not. If Priv(n), then Π(Γ(σ : n)) = Π({Dom(n)}) = Perm(n). Thus, if P ∈ Perm(n), then σ : n P by [ 3 ]. On the other hand, σ : n P implies that P ∈ Perm(n), regardless of whether n is privileged or not. If ¬Priv(n), then
By definition of Π and Γ, P ∈ Π(Γ(σ)) implies P ∈ Π(Γ(σ )) and P ∈ Perm(n). Then, σ P follows by the induction hypothesis, and σ : n P by [ 2 ] . On the other hand, σ : n P requires that σ P and P ∈ Perm(n). The induction hypothesis implies P ∈ Π(Γ(σ )), and P ∈ Π(Γ(σ : n)) follows by definition of Π and Γ.
Theorem 7. Let τ |= T P = (G, Perm). Then
Proof. We prove the following, stronger, result:
Equation (A.7) follows by (A.8a) by noticing that -If ¬Priv(n), then τ call (n) = τ in (n), and Γ(σ : n) = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)};
-If Priv(n), then τ call (n)={{Dom(n)}} (because τ in (n) = ∅ when (A.8a) is true), and Γ(σ : n) = {Dom(n)}.
We prove (A.8a) and (A.8b) simultaneously by induction on the length of the derivation [] · · · σ : n, x . The base case corresponds to our single axiom:
.
We show that γ = {Dom(n)} satisfies (A.8a). Since • −→ n, we have that
Then,
For the inductive case, we proceed by case analysis on the rule used to deduce the last step of the derivation for σ : n, x .
-Case [call ]:
(n ) = call n −→ n σ : n σ : n : n where σ = σ : n By the induction hypothesis ((A.8a)), we have
If ¬Priv(n ), we show that γ = γ ∪ {Dom(n)} satisfies (A.8a). Since
and γ ∈ τ in (n ) by (A.9), it follows that γ ∈ τ in (n). Moreover,
If Priv(n ), we show that γ = {Dom(n )} ∪ {Dom(n)} satisfies (A.8a). Since
then γ ∈ τ in (n), and
(m) = return n n σ : n : m σ : n By Lemma 1, any trace leading to σ : n : m is of the form
where (n ) = call, n −→ µ(m), and m ∈ ρ(n ) by Lemma 2. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis to σ : n as well as to σ : n : m, obtaining
We show that γ = γ satisfies (A.8a). First, notice that γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)}, because Dom(n) = Dom(n ) by Constraint 4. Second, we prove that γ ∈ τ in (n). If ¬Priv(n ), then
To show that Trans(n , γ ), i.e.,
In the case Priv(n ), we have
To show that Trans(n , {Dom(n )}), i.e., ∃m ∈ ρ(n ), γ ∈ τ in (m).
(n ) = check(P ) σ : n P n n σ : n σ : n By the induction hypothesis ((A.8a)), we have
We show that γ = γ satisfies (A.8a). First, notice that γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)} by Constraint 4. Second, we prove that γ ∈ τ in (n). Since n n, we have
Since γ = γ , by (A.11) it follows that γ ∈ τ in (n ). By Constraint 5, we have γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n )} = Γ(σ : n ). Since σ : n P (premise of the pass rule), Theorem 6 implies that P ∈ Π(γ). Then γ ∈ τ in (n).
(n) = check(P ) σ : n P σ : n σ : n By the induction hypothesis ((A.8a)), we have ∃γ ∈ τ in (n). γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)} .
(A.12)
We show that γ = γ satisfies (A.8b). By the definition of T P catch , we have
By (A.12) and Constraint 5, it follows that γ = Γ(σ : n) ∈ τ in (n). Since σ : n P (premise of the fail rule), Theorem 6 implies P / ∈ Π(γ). Then γ ∈ τ catch (n).
n n σ : n σ : n By the induction hypothesis ((A.8b)), we have
We show that γ = γ satisfies (A.8a). Since n n, we have
Then γ ∈ τ in (n) follows by (A.13), and γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)} follows by Constraint 4. We apply the induction hypothesis to σ : n as well as to σ : n : m , obtaining
By Definition 4, m ∈ ξ 1 (n); indeed, n −→ µ(m) follows by Lemma 1, m is a premise of the throw rule, and ξ(m) = ∅ by Lemma 3. We show that γ = γ satisfies (A.8b). There are two subcases, according to whether n is privileged or not. If ¬Priv(n), then
where Catch(n, γ) holds if
Since m ∈ ξ 1 (n), we have
Then γ ∈ τ catch (n). If Priv(n), then
To show Catch(n, {Dom(n)}), observe that
A.3 Completeness of TP analysis
Theorem 8. Let be the following partial order:
Then, there exists a unique τ |= T P = (G, Perm) minimal w.r.t. , and γ ∈ τ call (n) = ⇒ ∃σ. G σ : n ∧ γ = Γ(σ : n) .
(A.16)
Proof. The proof is split into four parts:
1. Lemma 4 formalizes the intuitive concept that, in our model, reachability is only a matter of access control. This enables us to prove the following item.
Lemma 5, showing that
is indeed an invariant for the worklist-iteration algorithm in Table 5 . 3. Lemma 6 shows that, whenever the algorithm terminates, it computes a solution to the TP analysis. Moreover, the solution is minimal w.r.t. (A.15). 4. Finally, Lemma 7 shows that the algorithm always terminates.
Lemma 4. Let G σ : n, G σ : m, x , and n = ε(µ(m)). Then
Proof. Since n = ε(µ(m)
We can always determine h in such a way that, for each i ∈ h..k: This is because there always exists a trace leading to σ : m, x that never returns from µ(m). Therefore, if we prove that, for any i ∈ h..k − 1,
then we can conclude G σ : m, x . The proof is by cases on the rule applied to deduce the transition σ : σ i , x i σ : σ i+1 , x i+1 . We work out only the most relevant cases. First, consider the pass rule, which instances to
, where n h = n and n 0 ∈ µ(m) by hypotheses (a) and (b). Assume first there are no privileged nodes in σ i . Using the fact that n 0 , n, m are in the same method (so they are in the same protection domain by Constraint 4), and by hypothesis Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)} = Γ(σ ) ∪ {Dom(m)}, we obtain
Otherwise, let i be the index of the topmost privileged node in σ i . Then
In both cases, we have shown Γ(σ : σ i ) = Γ(σ : σ i ). Since σ : σ i P , by Theorem 6 it follows that σ : σ i P . Thus, the pass rule gives σ : σ i , x i σ : σ i+1 , x i+1 . Consider now the fail rule, which instances to (n ) = check(P ) σ : σ i : n P σ : σ i : n σ : σ i : n , where σ i = σ i+1 = σ i : n . As in the previous case, Γ(σ : σ i ) = Γ(σ : σ i ). It follows that σ : σ i P , and the fail rule gives σ : σ i σ : σ i+1 . For the remaining rules, the transition σ : σ i σ : σ i+1 depends only on the edges of G and on the topmost node of σ i (for ret , also on the next-topmost node). Therefore, if σ :
Lemma 5. For each node n ∈ N , the statements
are invariant for the worklist-iteration algorithm.
Proof. We first prove that (A.17) follows by (A.18a). Let
by the assignment at line 16. By (A.18a) there exists some σ such that G σ : n and γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)} = Γ(σ : n). -If Priv(n), then γ = {Dom(n)} by the assignment at line 13. By (A.18a), there exists some σ such that G σ : n and γ = {Dom(n)} = Γ(σ : n).
The invariants hold when the while loop at lines 6-40 is entered; indeed, after the initialization loop at lines 2-3,
Next, assume (A.18a) and (A.18b) are satisfied for all iterations up to the i-th one. We show that the invariants are preserved after the (i + 1)-th iteration.
Consider (A.
If (n) = check(P ), then, by the assignment at line 21,
. Since γ ∈ in[n] and (A.18a) holds at the i-th iteration, then
Since check nodes cannot be privileged (Constraint 5), γ = Γ(σ : n), and σ : n P follows by Theorem 6. Then, by the fail rule:
(n) = check(P ) σ : n P σ : n σ : n .
In conclusion, we have shown that G σ : n and γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n)}. Thus, (A.18b) is preserved by the assignment at line 21.
If (n) = call, we have two subcases, depending on n being privileged or not.
If ¬Priv(n), then, by the assignment at line 18,
; moreover, since both the invariants (A.18a) and (A.18b) hold at the i-th iteration, we have
Let n = ε(µ(m)). Since m ∈ ξ 1 (n), by Definition 4 it follows that n −→ µ(m) and m . Then, by the call rule, we have (n) = call n −→ n σ : n σ : n : n . Moreover, we have that
This enables us to apply Lemma 4 to deduce G σ : n : m . Then, by throw ,
If Priv(n), then, by the assignment at line 15,
Let γ ∈ catch[n]. Then, there exist m ∈ ξ 1 (n) and γ ∈ catch[m] such that γ = {Dom(n)} ∪ {Dom(m)}. Similarly to the case ¬Priv(n), we have G σ : n : n . Then Γ(σ : n) ∪ {Dom(n )} = {Dom(n)} ∪ {Dom(n )} = γ and G σ : n follows by throw . This concludes the proof of (A.18b).
To prove that also the invariant (A.18a) holds, consider the for loop at lines 22-34. At each iteration, out[n, n ] is computed for some (n, n ) ∈ E. When the condition of the if statement at line 32 is false, the array in is left unchanged. Otherwise, only the value of in[n ] is updated, and we have
Then, it suffices to show that (A.18a) holds for γ ∈ out[n, n ]. There are only the following cases, according to the kind of the edge (n, n ): -Case [entry]: if • −→ n , then, after the assignment at line 25,
Let γ = {Dom(n )} and σ = []. Then, G σ : n follows by rule entry , and γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n )}. -Case [call ]: if n −→ n , then, by Constraints 1 and 2, it must be (n) = call. Whether n is privileged or not, since it has been extracted from the worklist, the guards at lines 32, 36, 39 make sure that in[n] = ∅. Since (A.18a) holds at the i-th iteration of the while loop, it follows that G σ : n for some σ . Let σ = σ : n. Then, G σ : n follows by (n) = call n −→ n σ : n σ : n : n .
By the assignment at line 27, we have
by the assignment at line 16. Then, each γ ∈ call[n] in on the form γ = γ ∪ {Dom(n )}, for some γ ∈ in[n]. Since (A.18a) did hold when γ was inserted into in[n], we have
Then, (A.18a) is preserved because
If Priv(n), then, by the assignment at line 13,
-Case [transfer ]: if n n , then, by the assignment at line 29,
By Constraint 2, n cannot be a return node, so we have to consider two subcases, i.e., that n is a check or a call node. If (n) = check(P ), then, by the assignment at line 20, we have
Take γ ∈ in[n] such that P ∈ Π(γ). By (A.18a) and by Constraint 5, we have
(A.21)
Theorem 6 implies that σ : n P . Therefore, G σ : n follows by the rule (n) = check(P ) σ : n P n n σ : n σ : n .
Since µ(n) = µ(n ), Constraint 4 implies that γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n )}. If (n) = call, we must consider two subcases, depending on whether n is privileged or not. If ¬Priv(n), by the assignment at line 17,
Let γ ∈ trans[n]; then, there exist m ∈ ρ(n) and γ ∈ in[m] such that γ = γ ∪ {Dom(m)}. By applying (A.18a) for n as well as for m,
Observe that, since m ∈ ρ(n), it must be n −→ m for m = ε(µ(m)). Then, G σ : n : m follows by the rule
Moreover, we have that
This enables us to apply Lemma 4 to deduce G σ : n :
If Priv(n), then out[n, n ] = in[n] and {Dom(n)} ∪ {Dom(m)} ∈ in[m] for some m ∈ ρ(n), because line 32 ensures that out[n, n ] = ∅. Let γ ∈ in[n] and γ = {Dom(n)} ∪ {Dom(m)}. Then, (A.22a) and (A.22b) are still valid, and Lemma 4 can be applied by noticing that
Therefore, by arguments similar to those used for the case ¬Priv(n), we find that G σ : n and that γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n )}. -Case [catch]: if n n , then, by the assignment at line 31,
Let γ ∈ catch[n]. Since we have already proved that (A.18b) is valid at the (i + 1)-th iteration of the while loop, we have
Then, G σ : n follows by the rule n n σ : n σ : n and γ = Γ(σ) ∪ {Dom(n )} immediately follows from µ(n ) = µ(n).
Lemma 6. If the worklist-iteration algorithm terminates, then it computes the least solution to the TP analysis. More formally, if we define TP = in, out, trans, call, catch , then TP|=T P = (G), and TP is minimal w.r.t. the partial order (A.15), i.e.,
Proof. We start by showing the minimality of TP w.r.t. (A.15). Consider an arbitrary solution τ |= T P = (G). We prove that
is invariant for the while loop, for each n ∈ N and (m, n) ∈ E. Define in 0 as the value of the array in at the entry of the while loop and in i as the value of the array after the assignment at line 33 of the i-th iteration. Similarly for the arrays out, call, trans, and catch and for the the worklist W. After the initialization for loops at lines 2-3 and 4-5, we have
for each n ∈ N and (m, n) ∈ E, so all (A.23) are trivially satisfied. Next, we show that the inclusion relations are preserved after each iteration of the while loop. Let i > 0 and assume (A.23) are satisfied for all iterations up to the i-th, for each n ∈ N and (m, n) ∈ E. We first prove the invariants (A.23c)-(A.23e 
If Priv(n), the assignment at line 13 reads as
Indeed, the if statements at lines 32, 36, and 39 ensure that an assignment to in[n] took place before n was inserted into the worklist, say, at the j-th iteration of the while, with j < i. Therefore, in j [n] = ∅, and
, it follows τ in (n) = ∅, and thus
By arguments similar to those used for the case ¬Priv(n),
: if (n) = check(P ), by the assignments at lines 20-21: 
-Case [call ]: if n −→ n , then, by the assignment at line 27,
-Case [catch]: if n n , then, by the assignment at line 31,
To prove (A.23a) is an invariant, observe that, by the assignment at line 33, and using the fact that τ |= T P = (G),
Thus we conclude that, if we eventually obtain a solution, then it is minimal. Now, we show that the arrays in, out, call, trans, and catch satisfy the equations of Table 3 . Note first that, for each n ∈ N , by construction of the arrays in and out,
is invariant in the worklist-iteration algorithm. This is ensured by the assignment at line 33, because for each (m, n) ∈ E the value out[m, n] grows monotonically. Therefore, the array in satisfies the equation for T P in .
To show that call satisfies the equation for T P call , consider a call node n. Two cases arise, depending on whether n is privileged or not. If ¬Priv(n), consider first the case that in[n] is never assigned at line 33. As in[n] = ∅, neither the assignment at line 34 nor those at lines 37 and 40 can take place; indeed, the first assignment is always executed after a nonempty assignment to in[n], while the others are prevented by the if statements at lines 36 and 39, respectively. Thus, n is never inserted into W, and
be assigned for the last time at the ith iteration of the while loop (recall that we assume the algorithm terminates). In this case, in[n] never changes its value after the i-th iteration; otherwise, n would be inserted into W again at line 34 and call[n] would be updated in a subsequent iteration. Therefore, by the assignment at line 16,
If Priv(n), consider first the case that in[n] is never assigned inside the while loop. By the same arguments used above, we have
Otherwise, if in[n] = ∅, then, by the assignment at line 13, we have
and the value call[n] is no longer changed inside the while loop. This concludes the proof that call satisfies the equation for T P call . To show that trans satisfies the equation for T P trans , take a node n. There are two cases, depending on whether n is a check or a call node. Consider first the case (n) = check(P ). As seen above, if in[n] is never assigned, then
Otherwise, if trans[n] is last updated at the i-th iteration of the while loop, then in[n] cannot change its value after that iteration, and we have
If (n) = call, consider first the case that n is never inserted into the worklist, that is, in[n] = ∅. If ¬Priv(n), this implies
Similarly, if Priv(n),
Otherwise, say n is extracted for the last time from W at the i-th iteration. Then, it cannot happen that in[n] changes its value after that iteration (as seen above) or that in[m] for any m ∈ ρ(n). The latter statement is proved by contradiction. Assume that, for some m ∈ ρ(n) and j > i,
Then, by the assignment at line 34, m ∈ W j . Since W is empty at the exit of the algorithm, there is an index h > j such that m = Head(W h ). Thus, m is extracted from the worklist at the h-th iteration, and, after the for loop at lines 35-37, n ∈ W h . Since h > j > i, this contradicts our assumption that n is extracted for the last time from W at the i-th iteration. If ¬Priv(n), then, by the assignment at line 17 of the i-th iteration,
Similarly, if Priv(n), at the exit of the while,
This concludes the proof that trans satisfies the equation for T P trans . To show that catch satisfies the equation for T P catch , take a node n. There are two cases, depending on whether n is a check or a call node. Consider first the case (n) = check(P ). Just as above, if in[n] is never assigned,
Otherwise, if catch[n] is last updated at the i-th iteration of the while loop, then in[n] cannot change its value after that iteration, and we have
If in[n] = ∅, let n be extracted for the last time from W at the i-th iteration. Then, it cannot happen that in[n] changes its value after that iteration (as seen above), or that catch[m] for any m ∈ ξ 1 (n). The latter statement is proved by contradiction. Assume that, for some m ∈ ξ 1 (n) and j > i,
Then, after the for loop at lines 38-40, n would be inserted into W again, i.e., n ∈ W j . Since j > i, this contradicts our assumption that n is extracted for the last time from W at the i-th iteration. If ¬Priv(n), then, by the assignment at line 18 of the i-th iteration,
We conclude the proof by showing that out satisfies the equation for T P out in Table 3 . Consider the switch statement at lines 23-31. First, let • −→ n . Since, by the assignment at line 1, n ε is present in W when the while loop is entered and W is empty at the exit of the algorithm, it follows that n ε must be extracted from W during an iteration of the loop. According to the assignment at line 25, we have
For the remaining cases, notice that the assignments made to out at lines 27, 29, and 31 correspond literally to the cases in Table 3 . The fact that call, trans and catch satisfy the corresponding equations therefore suffices.
In the end, we have shown that, whenever the worklistiteration algorithm terminates, it computes the least solution to the TP analysis.
Lemma 7. The worklist-iteration algorithm always terminates.
Proof. The bounded for loops at lines 2-3 and 4-5 trivially terminate. The worklist contains just the entry point n ε when the while loop starts. Each iteration of the loop removes one node n from the worklist and may add a finite number of nodes by the assignments at lines 34, 37, and 40. Consider the following cases:
-If (n) = return or (n) = check(P ), then n can be inserted into W only at line 34. Indeed, by the definition of ξ 1 and ρ, it follows that
so n can be appended to W neither at line 37 nor at line 40. Therefore, n can be added to the worklist only if, for some (m, n) ∈ E,
which corresponds to the condition in the if statement at line 32. Thus, the new value assigned to in[n] at line 33 strictly contains the old one. Since D is finite, its subsets are also finite, and the condition of the if statement will eventually become false. Therefore, n cannot be inserted into W infinitely often. -If (n) = call, then n can be inserted into W at lines 34, 37, and 40. As above, line 34 cannot contribute infinitely often, so we are left to consider lines 37 and 40 only. Consider line 37 first. By contradiction, assume that it endlessly inserts n into W; then, there is a return node n such that n ∈ ρ(n) and n appears in W an infinite number of times. Contradiction: this cannot happen for return nodes. Next, consider line 40. By contradiction, assume that it endlessly inserts n into W; then, there is a node n such that n ∈ ξ 1 (n) and n appears in W infinitely often. Moreover, the inequality
holds for an infinite number of iterations. Since D is finite, this is a contradiction. -Finally, if n = n ε , then n is never inserted into the worklist after line 1. Actually, n ε cannot be inserted into W either by lines 37 or 40 (it is not a call node), or by line 34 (it is never a target node in edges). Therefore, each node can be inserted into the worklist only a finite number of times: this causes the worklist to be eventually exhausted and the algorithm to terminate.
A.4 Computational complexity
The bounded for loops at lines 2-3 and 4-5 are executed |N | and |E| times, respectively. Each iteration of the while loop at lines 6-40 extracts a node from the worklist and may add new nodes to it because of the assignments at lines 34, 37, and 40. The if statement at line 32 ensures that, for each node n, the new value assigned to in[n] strictly contains the old one. Moreover, we can safely modify our algorithm so that it no longer inserts a node n into W once in[n] reaches its maximal value 2 |D G | , where D G is the set of protection domains actually occurring in G. Therefore, the body of while loop may be executed at most |N | · 2 2 |D G | ) comparisons. The linear factor can be discarded if we assume that, for each call node n, the set { in[m] | m ∈ ρ(n) } is maintained, e.g., inside the for loop at lines 35-37. Similar arguments apply for line 18, so each iteration of the while loop can be executed in time proportional to 2 2 |D G | . Therefore, the worst-case complexity of the algorithm is
However, this upper bound is too pessimistic indeed. The exponential factor only occurs when the number of protection domains is proportional to the number of nodes, as the pathological case in example 4 shows. Actually, each protection domain corresponds to a grant entry in the policy file that defines the authorization state of the program; thus, the number of protection domains depends on the security policy associated with the program, rather than on the program size.
Thus, the worst-case complexity of the algorithm can be rewritten as
where the constant c depends on the number of protection domains in G. An upper bound to the space complexity of the algorithm is
where the exponential factor has been discarded by the arguments above.
Example 4. For any k > 0, let D k = {D 0 , . . . , D k }, and let G k be the CFG:
where (m i ) = (n i ) = call for i ∈ 1..k, and n m is short for n −→ m and m −→ n. As an example, the CFG G 3 is depicted in Fig. 4 . 
for an arbitrary security policy Perm. By Theorem 7, it follows that γ ∈ τ in (m i ). Then,
A.5 Program transformations
Lemma 8. Letṅ be inlineable in G. Then, for each state σ: : if σ = σ : n , top(σ ) =ṅ andσ = inlṅ(σ ), then inlṅ(σ) =σ : n . Moreover, by condition (1b), it follows thatṅ −→ µ(n ). Let γ = Γ G (σ ), andγ = ΓĠ(σ ). There are two subcases, according to whether n is privileged or not. If Priv G (n ), then γ = {Dom G (n )}. By Definition 6, we have that PrivĠ(n ) and DomĠ(n ) = Dom G (n ). Sinceṅ −→ µ(n ), by rule Inl 3 it follows that
Otherwise, if ¬Priv G (n ), then
by Definition 6 =γ ∪ {DomĠ(n )} by rule Inl 3 =γ as ¬PrivĠ(n ) .
-Case [inl 3 ]: if σ = σ :ṅ : n , then inlṅ(σ) =σ : n , whereσ = inlṅ(σ ). Note that, by Lemma 1 and condition (1a),ṅ −→ µ(n ). Let γ = Γ G (σ ) andγ = ΓĠ(σ ). We have to consider the following cases. If Priv G (n ), by Definition 6, it follows that PrivĠ(n ) and DomĠ(n ) = Dom G (ṅ). Then, γ = {Dom G (n )} andγ = {DomĠ(n )}, and, by rule Inl 4 ,
Otherwise, if ¬Priv G (n ), there are two further subcases, according to whetherṅ is privileged or not. If Priv G (ṅ), then PrivĠ(n ) follows by Definition 6, and
by rules Inl 3 and Inl 4 = {DomĠ(n )} by Definition 6 =γ as PrivĠ(n ) .
=γ ∪ {DomĠ(n )} by Definition 6 =γ as ¬PrivĠ(n ) .
Theorem 9. Letṅ be inlineable in G andĠ be theṅ-inlined version of G. Then, each trace of G corresponds to a trace ofĠ, i.e., Proof. Consider the forward implication first. We proceed by case analysis on the rule used to deduce σ i , x i σ i+1 , x i+1 . We omit a detailed discussion of the cases fail and catch because they are treated similarly to the cases fail and ret , respectively.
(n) = call n −→ n σ : n σ : n : n Here σ i = σ : n and σ i+1 = σ : n : n . Let σ : n = inlṅ(σ : n) =σ i . If n =ṅ, then rule icall1 yields (n) = call n −→ n n =ṅ σ : n ṅ inl σ : n : n .
To show thatσ i+i = σ : n : n = inlṅ(σ : n : n ) = inlṅ(σ i+1 ), it suffices to note that rule inl 2 instances to inlṅ(σ : n) = σ : n top(σ : n) =ṅ inlṅ(σ : n : n ) = σ : n : n .
Otherwise, if n =ṅ, then rules icall2 and inl 3 give Second, assume σ = σ : n . Condition (1a) ensures that n =ṅ, because otherwise it would beṅ −→ µ(ṅ). Then, rule inl 2 gives inlṅ(σ : n ) =σ top(σ : n ) =ṅ inlṅ(σ : n :ṅ) =σ :ṅ .
On the other hand, it is also σ :ṅ = inlṅ(σ :ṅ). Therefore, σ =σ. -Case [ret ]:
(n ) = return n m σ : n : n σ : m Let σ : n = inlṅ(σ : n : n ). We have to consider two subcases. Ifṅ −→ µ(n ), letσ : n = inlṅ(σ : n). Then, Lemma 1 ensures that n =ṅ, hence rules inl 2 and iret1 give inlṅ(σ : n) =σ : n top(σ : n) =ṅ inlṅ(σ : n : n ) =σ : n : n (n ) = return n mṅ −→ µ(n ) σ : n : n (n) = check(P ) σ : n P n m σ : n σ : m Letσ : n = inlṅ(σ : n), and let τ |= T P = (G, Perm). By Theorem 7 and Constraint 5, there exists a context γ ∈ τ in (n) such that γ = Γ G (σ : n). Then σ : n G,Perm P ⇐⇒ P ∈ Π(Γ G (σ : n)) by Theorem 6 ⇐⇒ P ∈ Π(Inlṅ(Γ G (σ : n))) by condition (1d) ⇐⇒ P ∈ Π(ΓĠ(inlṅ(σ : n))) by Lemma 8 ⇐⇒ P ∈ Π(ΓĠ(σ : n)) by def.σ : n ⇐⇒σ : n Ġ ,Perm P by Theorem 6 , where σ : n G,Perm P emphasizes the fact that the relation depends on a given CFG G and security policy Perm. Then, rule check gives (n) = check(P )σ : n P n ṁ σ : n Otherwise, ifṅ −→ µ(n ), then by condition (1b) and Lemma 1 it follows that σ = σ :ṅ for some σ . Letσ = inlṅ(σ ). Then, rules inl 3 and icatch2 give inlṅ(σ ) =σ inlṅ(σ :ṅ : n ) =σ : n n ṅ −→ µ(n ) σ : n ṅ inlσ :ṅ .
To prove thatσ :ṅ = inlṅ(σ), observe that, since top(σ ) =ṅ is ensured by condition (1a), then rule inl 2 instances to inlṅ(σ ) =σ top(σ ) =ṅ inlṅ(σ :ṅ) =σ :ṅ .
For the backward implication, we proceed by case analysis on the rule used to deduce σ i , x i σ i+1 , x i+1 . The function inl is bijective: given an inlined stateσ, the original state can be recovered by insertingṅ before each n occurring inσ wheneverṅ −→ µ(n ).
-Case [icall1 ]:
(n) = call n −→ n n =ṅ σ : n ṅ inl σ : n : n .
Since inl is bijective, let σ : n be such that inlṅ(σ : n) = σ : n. Then (n) = call n −→ n σ : n σ : n : n inlṅ(σ : n) = σ : n top(σ : n) =ṅ inlṅ(σ : n : n ) = σ : n : n follow by rules call and inl 2 , respectively. (n ) = return n mṅ −→ µ(n ) σ : n : n ṅ inlσ : m Sinceṅ −→ µ(n ), by condition (1a) it follows that n = n. Thus, let σ : n : n be such that inlṅ(σ : n : n ) =σ : n : n . Then (n ) = return n m σ : n : n σ : m inlṅ(σ : n) =σ : n top(σ : n) =ṅ inlṅ(σ : n : n ) =σ : n : n follow by rules ret and inl 2 , respectively, whileσ : m = inlṅ(σ : m) immediately follows by the fact thaṫ σ : n = inlṅ(σ : n).
-Case [iret2 ]:
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